Would you like to make this site your homepage? It's fast and easy...
Yes, Please make this my home page!
Welcome to A Soldiers Thoughts from the Second World War Webpage.
Cassino - the NZ Offensive
Previous
The plan for the oft-postponed attack on Cassino, provided for its capture by 6 Brigade after a colossal bombing of the town area by nearly 500 medium and heavy bombers. One thousand tons of 1000 pound high-explosive bombs were to be dropped on the target. Artillery support on a grander scale than ever before was then to assist the infantry on to their objectives. Fifth Brigade was again earmarked for exploitation, with the 23rd briefed to accompany 4 Armoured Brigade into the Liri valley.
Promptly at 8.30 a.m. on 15 March, the first wave of American bombers came over and dropped their bombs on Cassino. Most of the 23rd men had front-row seats for this show. The sight was stirring enough for men who had grown tired of waiting for some progress to be made but the noise was deafening. When the bombing ceased, the roar of the guns, the bursting of mortar bombs and the rattling of machine guns continued to numb the eardrums. At 12.30 p.m. 6 Brigade launched its attack from the north by sending the 25th into the town. At first this advance went well, but the rubble and debris from bombed buildings slowed down all movement and, in some places, blocked the supporting tanks. Point 193 (Castle Hill) was captured in the early afternoon, but fierce opposition prevented the taking of the western and south-western parts of Cassino. Although the 24th and 26th were also committed to the attack in the late afternoon and took some ground, the Germans held fast to their posts in the western sector. That night rain fell, filled the huge bomb craters and blocked roads the tanks might have used. The enemy thus had time to reinforce.
The 23rd stood on two hours' notice to move from 15 till 19 March. During those days, it became only too clear that there was no hope of the whole operation being carried through to a successful conclusion. On 19 March the 23rd received orders to relieve one company of the 24th and the whole of the 25th. A Company was to relieve the company of the 24th in positions along a sunken road in the south of the town. To the north of A, C Company was to occupy the houses - or, rather, their remains - on Route 6 opposite the German occupied Continental Hotel. North of Route 6, D (Major Slee) and B were to occupy sectors running towards the foot of Castle Hill. At first light next morning, the 23rd was to clear the rest of the town of the enemy. In view of the experience of 6 Brigade, this task of clearing the town sounded too delightfully simple.
At 6.45 p.m. a tactical headquarters was established in the crypt of the convent, where a variety of command posts were operating. Telephone communications were soon established with the main 23rd headquarters and with Brigade, but heavy shell and mortar fire soon cut the line to bits and made its maintenance impossible. The 23rd therefore had to be content with wireless communications, which were also subject to interference.
After dark, the companies moved independently along Route 6 to the crypt. Mortar and machine-gun fire forced them to move cautiously, with intervals between the men in single file. Even so, casualties were sustained and progress was slow.
The amount of enemy fire of all kinds which met the 23rd on the way in necessitated a slight alteration in the proposed disposition of the companies. D Company relieved C Company of the 25th as arranged, while A Company relieved the remains of both A and B Companies of the same battalion. But B Company remained in reserve with Battalion tactical headquarters.
Next morning the three forward companies had the task of clearing out the enemy. C Company sent a patrol along the remains of the Post Office corridor but found that every exit, whether broken hole or proper doorway, was covered by Spandau fire and it was practically impossible to move outside. Eventually the patrol returned to Company Headquarters, where they managed to call for tank fire on the radio. Since the enemy machine-gunners had not been located, they had to be flushed from their building by a process of trial and error. The men went downstairs while the tank put a shot through the top story, and then the procedure was reversed. By this means the house was cleared of enemy and the main machine-gun nest manned by paratroopers was located in the next house.
The main 23rd attack of the day was meanwhile being made by A and D Companies with the intention of clearing all enemy from the houses at the foot of Point 193 (Castle Hill). These companies made good progress for nearly 300 yards, although the rough state of the going made movement slow and awkward. The centre of the town was a wilderness of ruins. But in the heaps of rubble, or in the cellars and basement rooms covered with debris, were enemy strongpoints. As they advanced over some particularly rough mounds, the point sections of A and D Companies came under Spandau and submachine-gun fire from these strongpoints. Their progress slowed to a halt.
Because of the broken nature of the terrain, the D Company attack was not coordinated with A's. Major Slee and his men understood that their attack was to be made under a smoke screen but no smoke was laid in any place where it was likely to help them to get forward. With unsatisfactory communications and the resulting uncertainty as to whether or not smoke was to be laid, the company waited and waited until after midday, when Slee gave the order to advance without waiting longer for smoke.
Slee's plan was for 18 Platoon to remain in reserve in and around the school buildings and to support with fire from all weapons the advance of 16 and 17 Platoons. No. 18 Platoon certainly fired at the lower slopes of Castle Hill, but its men had no sight of the enemy and therefore no definite target to engage. Nos. 16 and 17 Platoons advanced with sections and parts of sections moving independently on account of the extremely broken nature of the ground. Three Maori's appeared from nowhere and, seeking to revenge the loss of their comrades the previous day, joined in the advance. But, as the men moved down the forward faces of piles of rubble or threaded their way carefully round the edge of cellars or bomb craters full of water, they came under enemy rifle and machine-gun fire. The leading section of 16 Platoon was allowed to move right out into the open before the enemy opened fire: all except two were picked off before they could reach cover. Platoon Headquarters and one section of 16 Platoon probably got the farthest forward: their path was probably more protected from view than those of the sections to left and right. But their experience when they emerged from behind cover was the same - killed or wounded before they dived for the cover of a hollow surrounded by shattered walls. But even here the enemy had some observation, for when Second-Lieutenant Norm Hardie, stood up to look over the remains of a window ledge he was promptly shot by a German with a Schmeisser sub-machine gun. While Sergeant Alan McLay was dressing Hardie's wounds, a grenade came hurtling over the wall and wounded McLay and others.
Under these circumstances, daylight attacks over ground so cratered and covered with debris that running was usually impossible and did nothing more than give the enemy good targets. Certainly, all the attacking sections on 20 March found progress impossible and the majority had to wait till well after dark before they could withdraw their wounded.
After dark B Company moved forward from the crypt to relieve D in the school. Although only 600 yards separated the two places, the company took over half an hour to walk the distance because of the bomb craters and the general accumulation of debris in what had once been tidy streets. The relief passed off without fighting or casualties.
At 5 a.m. on 22 March, it was decided to attack with two companies of infantry round the face of Castle Hill, with supporting fire from tanks. A Company of the 21st and D of the 23rd were to execute this attack, which was to be directed on to the houses already attacked twice by the 23rd companies and was this time to include the Continental Hotel. Since 8 Platoon of A Company of the 23rd was in the direct line of the fire of the tanks supporting this attack, it was withdrawn about 200 yards just before dawn.
At 8.30 a.m. D Company moved into position in the forming-up place near the school but it was after 9 a.m. before contact had been satisfactorily made with A Company of the 21st. At 9.50 a.m. the tanks, still well to the rear but as far forward as the state of the ground would allow, opened fire on the objective. Shortly after ten, the infantry began their advance, but they had not gone very far before the unexpected appearance of a party of Indians evacuating their wounded, under cover of a Red Cross flag, from the top of Castle Hill necessitated the postponement of the attack. The time taken by the Indians to bring out their wounded and that needed to reorganise the supporting tank fire meant that the attack proper was not mounted till 12.45 p.m. While the D Company infantry waited, a Focke-Wulf 190 nose-dived above them and appeared to be certain to shoot them up, but instead it crashed somewhat to the rear. The pilot emerged safely and tried to make his way back to the German positions but blundered into A Company and was taken prisoner.
At first, the advance went smoothly enough, cover from enemy observation being given by the sharp-edged and rocky ridge which ran down the face. For the assault, 18 Platoon (Second- Lieutenant Hanrahan) was in the centre and in the lead, while 17 Platoon was on the right and 16 Platoon on the left. As they approached the opening in the ridge which they named 'The Gap' or 'The Pass', Hanrahan prepared to lead the dash through the gap. He shouted back to his men, "Are you right?" and Corporal L. W. Burford, in command of the leading section, replied "All O.K.!" Hanrahan ran through the opening and his men hurried to follow, but the first man to attempt to negotiate that gap was hit by a stream of bullets and it was obvious that the yard-wide opening was under heavy machine-gun fire and could not be used. But Hanrahan himself had no option but to go forward. He ran slightly downhill about 30 yards to the nearest house and, from the shelter of it, signalled to his men to stay behind cover. Peering through a window, he saw two Germans hurrying upstairs to get a Spandau into position. He shot them both with his tommy gun and was not troubled further by Germans trying to occupy the room next to the point where he was sheltering.
In 18 Platoon, NCOs and men realised the impossibility of passing through 'The Gap' and therefore they tried to advance on a broader front by clambering over the rocks. But no sooner had the first heads appeared over the ridge than streams of bullets whistled past and the leading men suffered casualties. Obviously the tactical advantage of surprise was lost and the chances of a successful advance appeared to be nil. Hanrahan's problem was now one of getting back to his men through the continuous fire which greeted any movement on the ridge. This problem was solved in a manner not provided for in the textbooks. “I thought I had no show of getting out alive,” he said afterwards, “and, if ever I prayed, I prayed then and almost immediately afterwards a smoke shell landed in exactly the right place for me and I went back at the double”. During the time he was pinned down, he had a German rifle grenade (they were about egg size) explode on his back with nothing more serious than a ruffled patch on his leather jerken and a bruise!
Slee now sent 16 Platoon round to the left, lower down the slopes of Castle Hill. Even before its members ventured into view of the enemy, they came under heavy rifle grenade fire but, by keeping low and crawling from rock to rock, they got farther forward.
The intensified enemy fire and the precipitous nature of the ground halted the advance. No. 16 Platoon engaged the enemy houses and dugouts with Brens and rifles but, in view of their exposed positions, which compared unfavourably with the cover enjoyed by the enemy, it was obvious that the defence had the better of the duel. After lying out on and behind the ridge till after 5 p.m., D Company moved back to the gaol.
Previous Next - Cassino - Last Moments
|
Back to Homepage
